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Abstract. Nineteen Prescott Fire Department, Granite Mountain Hot Shot
(GMHS) wildland ﬁreﬁghters and supervisors (WFF), perished on the June 2013
Yarnell Hill Fire (YHF) in Arizona. The ﬁreﬁghters left their Safety Zone during
forecast, outflow winds, triggering explosive ﬁre behavior in drought-stressed
chaparral. Why would an experienced WFF Crew, leave ‘good black’ and travel
downslope through a brush-ﬁlled chimney, contrary to their training and
experience? An organized Serious Accident Investigation Team (SAIT) found,
“… no indication of negligence, reckless actions, or violations of policy or
protocol.” Despite this, many WFF professionals deemed the catastrophe, “…
the ﬁnal, fatal link, in a long chain of bad decisions with good outcomes.” This
paper is a theoretical and realistic examination of plausible, faulty, human
decisions with prior good outcomes; internal and external impacts, influencing
the GMHS; and two explanations for this catastrophe: Individual Blame Logic
and Organizational Function Logic, and proposed preventive mitigations.
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1 Introduction
Per the National Wildﬁre Coordinating Group (NWCG), “Wildland ﬁreﬁghting
(WF) is a high-risk occupation, evidenced each year by deaths or injuries in the line of
duty” [1]. One way the NWCG recognized to help reduce these WFF fatalities is to “…
identify factors responsible for past fatalities, … [to] … mitigate those factors in future
ﬁre seasons” [1]. This current article presents essential details and inferences about the
June 2013 Yarnell Hill Fire (YHF), which resulted in the disastrous outcome of 19
WFF fatalities. The authors’ main goal is to provide a theoretical and realistic exam-
ination of the following subsections:
1. Wildland Fireﬁghting Rules
2. Environmental Influences
3. Human Failure Theory
4. Organizational Cultures and Influences
5. Conclusion with Recommendations
The authors’ motivation is twofold: (1) to identify WFF Decision Errors speciﬁc to
the YHF to recognize the dynamics involved in the adverse outcomes of this fatal
event, and (2) to apply this understanding for training, procedural, and/or systemic
change recommendations to prevent future WF disasters. As difﬁcult as this is, the
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following paper attempts to move beyond the desire to blame the fatalities on a speciﬁc
offender(s), also known as Individual Blame Logic (IBL), but to seek further under-
standing of the systemic causes triggering the outcomes, i.e., examining the entire WF
organization, known as Organizational Function Logic (OFL) [2].
The content of this paper solely reflects the views of the authors, both retired Hot
Shot Crew Superintendents, not those of any current or former Agency or Department.
Moreover, the authors are responsible for the inferences, suggestive evidence, facts,
and accuracy of the information presented herein. Some analyzed content may contain
subject matter judged by some to be graphic, disturbing, and/or offensive.
2 Wildland Fireﬁghting Rules
All WFFs are trained with speciﬁc rules, crucial to follow to ensure good direction,
leadership, preparedness, and safety. The Standard Fireﬁghting Orders, organized in a
deliberate and sequential way, are to be implemented and applied systematically in all
ﬁre situations [3]. Abiding by the WFF Rules promotes good decisions and outcomes
[3–7].
The most critical WFF lists of rules listed in our Incident Response Pocket Guide
(IRPG) [8] consist of:
1. Standard Fireﬁghting Orders
2. Eighteen Watch Out Situations
3. Downhill Checklist
4. Lookouts - Communications - Escape Routes - Safety Zones (LCES)
5. Common Denominators of Fire Behavior on Tragedy/ Near-Miss Fires
6. Wildland Urban Interface (WUI) Watch Outs
Regarding Entrapment Avoidance, a USFS Risk Management pamphlet states: “If
ﬁreﬁghters follow the Standard Fireﬁghting Orders and are alerted to the 18 Watch Out
Situations, much of the risk of ﬁreﬁghting can be reduced” [3]. Memorizing, under-
standing, and following the Ten Standard Fire Fighting Orders; and likewise mem-
orizing, recognizing, and mitigating the 18 Watch Out Situations; and the other WFF
Rules, are responsible for saving tens of thousands of WFF lives each-and-every ﬁre
season [7]. It is common knowledge and practice in the WF community that the WFF
Rules do work and that all ﬁreﬁghters must know and apply them [3–7, 12].
3 Environmental Influences
3.1 Fuels, Fire Weather, and Topography
Fireﬁghters discuss Wildland Fires in terms of fuels (what is burning), weather (what
are the influences), and topography (where is it burning). The YH Fire occurred in
central Arizona in rugged terrain covered in dense, decadent chaparral brush that had
not burned since 1966, creating an explosive fuel bed with extremely high rates of
spread and extreme resistance to control. It was critically hot and dry for weeks.
Epic Human Failure on June 30, 2013 121
As with the YHF, the strongest and most variable winds occur during thunderstorms,
and generate extreme downdrafts, micro-bursts, outflows, and gust fronts, which
adversely affect ﬁre behavior, thus exacerbating and seriously complicating WFF
choices and safety [9].
4 Human Failure Theory
Human Failure frequently has signiﬁcant consequences. The prescriptive Ten Standard
Fire Orders, created in the 1950s, and in subsequent years the cautionary Watch Out
Situations [10] are perceptive resolutions against wildland ﬁre fatalities, addressing risk
management, grouping them based on their importance in the following logical
sequence: (1) Fire Behavior, (2) Fireline Safety, (3) Organizational Control, and
(4) Fight Fire [3, 8, 10]. Annually, thousands of WFFs and Supervisors validate the
WFF Rules during required ﬁre refreshers and trainings. Almost every WFF agrees that
the YHF tragedy would have been impossible for 19 men to have died accordingly had
they held to these tried-and-trued WFF Rules [3, 7]. Arguing against the SAIT con-
clusions disclosed in the Serious Accident Investigation Report (SAIR), the authors
examined the Human Failure associations of how, why, and when the GMHS con-
sidered their actions acceptable risk(s) for years, unsuspectingly and steadily heading
toward a drift into failure [7, 9, 11].
4.1 Individual Blame and Organizational Factors
Catino (2008) established two distinct, possible approaches for explaining incident
origin and dynamics: (1) Individual Blame Logic (IBL) and (2) Organizational
Function Logic (OFL). Shown as two distinct reasons generating different outcomes,
IBL suits societal demands to identify accident cause(s) and transgressor(s). Con-
versely, OFL is an organizational and functional approach, aimed at identifying the
factors within the system supporting event occurrence. In the OFL method, expecta-
tions are similar events cannot recur or infrequently occur once these influences are
removed [2].
The IBL method seeks out careless, inattentive individuals who are liable. In
complex organizational systems, reprimanding an employee for an accident without
examining the system deﬁciencies may entail inadvertently transferring the risk(s) to
future employees [2]. The OFL emphasizes the avoidance of individual blame, how-
ever, it is dangerous to overlook legitimate individual responsibility. The collective
approach may risk concealing accountability and avoiding necessary questions of
where responsibility lies. It is possible to distort the emphasis in favor of wider
organizational factors, avoiding individual fault(s), even when that is where it resides
[2]. Clearly, both IBL and OFL infractions were present regarding the GMHS, based on
a steady drift into failure from 2009 until 2013 [7, 11]. These same logics can be
applied to all other WF fatality ﬁres with similar conclusions.
Far-and-away the most critically devious and potentially treacherous decision and
outcome pattern is the Bad Decisions with Good Outcomes. One can get away with this
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combination without any consequences whatsoever for an entire career, indeed an
entire lifetime. It is professionally safe to assert that this has been a fatal combination
on most, if not all, of the fatal wildland ﬁres, where ﬁreﬁghters were killed by ﬁre,
throughout the history of wildland ﬁreﬁghting, excluding those from other environ-
mental deaths, where WFF were killed by lightning, rocks, trees, and the like.
Southwestern New Mexico HS and writer Hannah Coolidge (2015) recounts her
Superintendent, “… talk[ing] about ‘bad decision/good outcome’ scenarios—how it’s
easy, once you’ve developed bad ﬁreﬁghting habits, to forget how dangerous those
habits are after engaging in them ‘repeatedly without negative consequences’” [4].
In the WFF realm, “Bad Decisions with Good Outcomes” (Fig. 1) is also referred
to as ‘The Rule of 99’ and the ‘Normalization of Deviance,’ coined by researcher
Dianne Vaughan examining the Challenger Space Shuttle disaster [13]. The authors
allege ongoing and recurring Bad Decisions with Good Outcomes for years as well as
the subtle influencing Fire Department attitude toward structures, a priority over WFF
safety, which likely swayed those ultimately responsible for the YHF fatalities [7].
The Prescott City Attorney (PCA) offered the following account of the survivor
GMHS lookout’s story, related to him by the PFD Wildland BC, who disagreed with
the account [14]. While moving vehicles with the Blue Ridge HS (BRHS), the GMHS
lookout allegedly overheard radio trafﬁc between DIVS A and the GMHS supervisor,
with 17 Crew members, atop a ridge in the black. In the radio call, DIVS A told the
GMHS supervisor to leave “the black,” which was safe, and join him at the BSR.
The GMHS supervisor protested, saying such a move would be dangerous. The radio
exchange turned into a dispute [14].
“My understanding of the argument between DIVS A and GMHS was that GMHS
supervisor did not want to go down,” said the PCA [14]. Per the PCA’s account, the
GMHS supervisor objected until DIVS A gave him a direct order to descend.
The GMHS supervisor acceded to the command to relocate to the BSR. He told
DIVS A that he thought it was a bad idea. During one of the ﬁnal radio transmissions,
the GMHS supervisor told DIVS A the Crew was not going to make it [14, 15]. Due to
a scarcity of actual recordings, these GMHS Crew Net radio ‘Discussing Our Options’
[14] excerpts are alleged and thus hearsay dialogue, where the ‘Arizona Rule 803,
Hearsay exceptions’ applies [16], allowing it as suggestive evidence in this paper [7].
John Hopkins University researchers found, “By narrowing attention, … attention
shifts from vision to audition caused increased activity in auditory cortex and decreased
activity in visual cortex and vice versa, reflecting the effects of attention on sensory
Fig. 1. Decisions and outcomes matrix
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representations.” The experiment was designed to create tunnel vision, but a com-
pletely unexpected event occurred. While vision was being tunneled, performance of
the audible control center decreased” [17]. The researchers further found that tunneled
vision leads to diminished hearing. Tunneled hearing led to diminished vision. The
researchers concluded that a person intently listening to audible cues, like a radio or
cell phone, could have diminished visual performance. In some cases, when the stress
is severe enough, the hearing receptors in the brain may shut off completely, referred to
as auditory exclusion [17]. This clearly relates to wildland ﬁreﬁghting.
Thus, the GMHS would primarily “see” the weather and ﬁre behavior that they were
focused on, however, their own brains may have sabotaged or delayed their ability to
perceive and react to threats from those recognized hazards or even from the focus they
were directing their attention to, typical of all humans engaged in this type of encounter
[17]. Numerous cell phone and radio conversations occurred during the YH Fire, likely
distracting them from truly ‘seeing’ the emerging weather and ﬁre behavior hazards and
reevaluating priorities contributing to their steady drift into failure [11, 17]. The ﬁre-
ﬁghters were aware of the forecast weather that morning; the risk factor was high
enough to make them think twice, but they deferred to their own judgment, unknow-
ingly falling victim to distractions. The weather forecast warned of considerable thun-
derstorm outflow wind danger, but the GMHS seemingly discounted those warnings,
and left their Safety Zone at the worst possible time [7]. Arizona is well known for its
dynamic, sometimes tragic large ﬁres; late June is considered extremely hazardous, i.e.
the Dude Fire (1990) when 6 WFF died, where severe outflow winds also set the stage
for potential deathtraps, and where harsh Human Failure also won out.
During an October 2013 YH Fire Site Visit, a Southwest HS Crew Superintendent
stated during the Integration Phase, where participants can share their emotions, con-
clusions, and such: “this was the ﬁnal, fatal link, in a long chain of bad decisions with
good outcomes, we saw this coming for years” [7] and about 8 other HS Superinten-
dents spoke up and stated they had all attempted unsuccessfully over the years through
peer pressure to get the GMHS to alter their unsafe actions [7]. So then, what happened
on that fateful afternoon to distort these experienced wildland ﬁre supervisors’ indi-
vidual and collective judgments to the degree they would put themselves, and their
Crew, clearly in harm’s way? Did they all perish in a predictable, and therefore,
avoidable death-by-ﬁre incident? Indeed, per the conclusion of these authors, they did.
However, this was not an “accident” as some have continued to falsely believe and
advocate [7, 9, 12]. Strict compliance with the WFF Rules bolsters WFF safety and for
those whom they were are ultimately responsible [3–7].
4.2 Abilene Paradox and Groupthink
The Abilene Paradox [18] is based on a parable about a family in Texas in July on a
hot, muggy day. Someone in the family suggests they take a trip to Abilene even
though they all know their car has no air conditioning. Throughout the trip, they are all
agreeing what a wonderful time they are having even though deep inside their hearts,
they are really hating it [18]. The Abilene Paradox succinctly means: “Go Along to Get
Along” and “Don’t Rock the Boat” [18]. During a July 2013 News Conference at the
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YHF Fatality Site, the PFD Wildland Fire BC commented: “I would have followed
them down there blindfolded” [7, 19, 23]. “They … stuck together … they saw and felt
the same way…” [7, 19, 23]. Despite attempting to protect the integrity of his men and
their decisions and justify the GMHS actions on June 30, 2013, these comments and
others strongly suggest both the Abilene Paradox and Groupthink, both very hazardous
attitudes [8].
Although the GMHS knew the stakes were high that day, none of them went to work
on June 30, 2013 planning on injuring themselves or others. None of them thought this
could happen. Likewise, they never considered they would be unnecessarily risking
their lives or leaving family members brokenhearted for the rest of their lives. Unwit-
tingly, they were merely a large and conﬁdent group with a herd mentality. Groupthink,
occurs when a group makes faulty decisions because group pressures lead to a deteri-
oration of “mental efﬁciency, reality testing, and moral judgment” [19]. Groups harm-
fully affected by Groupthink ignore safer alternatives such as occurred on the YHF when
the GMHS decided to leave their Safety Zone [19]. Avalanche survivor Megan
Michelson said once the plan to ski Tunnel Creek was made and they left the
back-country gate it was difﬁcult to think of removing herself from the group, [20].
There were broken conversations of how to manage the run but not a full group con-
versation on doing it safely [20]. These same ‘broken conversations’ likely occurred
amongst the GMHS in the black and along the route to the Boulder Springs Ranch
(BSR), bolstering and intensifying the devious, insidious power of Groupthink [9, 20].
4.3 The Morality of Obeying Stupid Orders
In the WFF realm, one is told to obey orders unless they are one or more of the
following: (1) unsafe, (2) illegal, (3) unethical, or (4) immoral. Vietnam Veteran Reed
argues to obey orders where the overall mission big-picture beneﬁts are sufﬁcient to
warrant the risks. “If the superior won’t back down, the lower leader has a moral
decision to make. If the lower leader thinks the mission is too dangerous for its beneﬁts,
he should resist the order to the point of refusing to carry it out” [21]. This is exactly
what the Acting GMHS Superintendent was doing, however, he was using ‘mitigating
or hinting speech,’ deﬁned as “any attempt to downplay or sugarcoat the meaning of
what is being said,” likely in deference to authority, instead of direct speech and actions
to hold true to their ultimate obligation of maintaining the safety and welfare of those
they supervise [22]. Gladwell described this in detail regarding a fatal aircraft mishap
when the Junior Pilot conceded to the Chief Pilot regarding escalating inclement
weather, rather than being more direct and persuasive in his safety concerns [22].
4.4 Public Decisions
“A factor that binds people to their actions is ‘going public’ when someone participates
in and is identiﬁed publicly with a decision, that person will resolve inconsistencies to
produce attitudes consistent with that choice” [13]. The authors contend that the GMHS
‘public decision’ to stay put in the black and not assist the Yarnell Structure Protection
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Specialist and to send the BRHS instead [7, 13] were overridden by what the authors
deﬁne as the stronger ‘micro-level public decisions’ during their discreet Crew Net
“discussing our options” radio conversations [7, 9, 13, 14].
5 Organizational Culture and Influences
5.1 Human Factor Barriers to Situation Awareness
The IRPG [8] lists several Hazardous Attitudes in the overarching ‘Human Factor
Barriers to Situation Awareness’ section. They include:
1. Invulnerable - That can’t happen to us
2. Anti-authority - Disregard of the team effort
3. Impulsive - Do something even if it’s wrong
4. Macho - Trying to impress or prove something
5. Groupthink - Afraid to speak up or disagree
The authors contend these hazardous attitudes exist in varying degrees in all WF
fatalities where they are killed by ﬁre. They reigned fatal that day, manifested as
perilous attitudes, decision making errors, and engagements, ultimately resulting in
their deaths [6, 7]. The authors and other WFF often expand on the Anti-authority
attitude, to include: “The rules don’t apply to us” and “Don’t tell us what to do.” The
authors argue that all the hazardous attitudes applied that day because they had gotten
so used to bad decisions with good outcomes for years, and this was merely normal
work to them [6, 7]. The insidious Groupthink mindset, discussed in more detail above,
prevailed that fatal day, and very likely a major cause of many Wildland Fire Human
Failures.
5.2 PFD Attitude and Influence
The PFD Wildland Battalion Chief (WBC) literally considered these GMHS men to be
his sons; he was virtually in shock, attempting to defend their fatal actions as well as
the Fire Department in a July 2013 New Conference at the YH Fire Fatality Site. He
essentially held structure protection as a higher priority than individual ﬁreﬁghter safety
when he stated: ‘no WFF is satisﬁed sitting in a Safety Zone while structures were
being threatened’ [23]. In addition, he used the Fallacies of Equivocation and False
Analogy [7] by maintaining what the GMHS did was identical to ﬁremen running into
burning buildings [7, 23]. Indeed, municipal/structural ﬁremen have much heavier
personal protective clothing, SCBA oxygen tanks, and much more water to apply to the
ﬁre compared to WFF. All these are strong indicators of mixed and/or conflicting
values contributing to confusion, frustration, and uncertainty, setting up for potential
human failures on any wildﬁre, mainly those with threatened structures, as on the YHF
and many others, and likely to continue with future ﬁres unless WFF truly learn the
costly lessons of these recurring tragedies [11].
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5.3 The Marine Corps Viewpoint and Influence
The three GMHS Marines garnered immense respect from their Crew as well as
considerable sway over them. The Marine ethos is one of a selfless group culture,
where the group is held in a higher regard than the individual [24]. A feature story on
the GMHS Marines stated, they “went into the toughest ﬁght they had ever faced with
no second-guesses. They had a mission to accomplish—protect the community of
Yarnell—and just like their time in the Corps, they were willing to lay down their lives
to achieve that goal” [25]. Indeed, honorable and laudable traits - until June 30, 2013.
Truly, this is a rather dramatic statement, and hopefully merely intended to soothe the
grief and pain of family, friends, and loved ones.
A Military.com video interview with the PFD WBC reveals: “at about 4:00 … I
clicked back on their frequency, and heard a couple things, … that they need to move,
that the ﬁre was coming back on their position” [26]. This contradicts the SAIT SAIR
stating there was a “gap of over 30 minutes in the information available for the GMHS
[9].” There was compliant GMHS communications at times, however, when they were
on the move leaving the good black, the SAIT SAIR alleges there was none [9].
It is also noteworthy the PFD WBC listened in on their Crew Net frequency, which
suggests he heard some ‘Discussing our options’ discreet radio conversations [14],
talking about whether to stay in the good, safe black or head down through the
unburned fuel in chutes and chimneys toward the BSR. It makes no sense. The GMHS
were perfectly safe, with the best vantage point of anyone on the YH Fire, save Air
Attack.
5.4 High Reliability Organizations (HRO)
HRO’s, such as aircraft carrier and nuclear power plant operations, are preoccupied
with all failures, especially small ones. Insigniﬁcant things that go wrong are often
early warning signals of deepening trouble and give insight into the health of the entire
system. If you catch problems before they grow bigger, you have more possible ways
to deal with them. Instead, we tend to overlook our failures, suggesting we are
incompetent, focusing instead on successes, suggesting we are competent [11, 27]. For
many WFF, this apparently is accepted guidance in theory, and not realistically, due to
the recurring WFF fatalities for the same fatal causes based on bad decisions.
The primary author was the Operations Specialist for a 1996 Fire Shelter Deploy-
ment Investigation that occurred on the Coconino NF outside Flagstaff, AZ [28]. The
Human Factors Specialist brieﬁng began with, “The ﬁrst thing we are going to do is
establish a conclusion, then ﬁnd the facts to ﬁt that conclusion.” The question was
broached: ‘Aren’t we supposed to follow the facts to lead us to a conclusion?’ The HF
Specialist reiterated, we would establish a conclusion, then ﬁnd the facts to ﬁt it. The
discussion concluded with: “Then we could write anything we wanted to” [7, 28].
The YHF Serious Accident Investigation Team (SAIT) followed that format of ﬁrst
establishing a conclusion when they discovered “no indication of negligence, reckless
actions, or violations of policy or protocol” [7, 9]. Stated in the afﬁrmative, this means
they did it all right. Yet 19 men died. It is impossible to do everything right on a
Epic Human Failure on June 30, 2013 127
wildland ﬁre and 19 men burn to death in one fell swoop. That ‘conclusion’ smacks of
Orwellian Doublespeak and even worse, Doublethink [29]. “To respect words and their
conveyance of reality is to show respect to the very foundation of reality. To manip-
ulate words is to seek to manipulate truth and to instead choose falsity and illusion over
reality. The manipulation of words is itself a violent act. …” [30]. The authors con-
ﬁdently argue, this ongoing, unsettling truth manipulation [30] has occurred with all
wildﬁre SAIT Reports, Reviews, and the like where WFF were killed by ﬁre [7].
Borrowing from Avalanche Fatality Human Factors, the “Expert Halo” heuristic
comes to mind, in which the experienced believe that their expertise will keep them safe
[31]. Several Individual, Organizational, and Social Factors likely contributed to and
influenced the PFD, including the emphasis on Structure Protection, setting up WFF
safety goal conflicts [11]. Avalanche human factors researcher McCammon writes that
the Default or consistency heuristic concludes that when a venture is still an abstract
notion, there are likely discussions about the various conditions, the pros/cons, and
deliberate assessments of the risks of proceeding take place. But once the initial decision
is made, deliberate calculations stop, that thought takes on deceptive power [31]. People
generally have a powerful bias for sticking with what they already have, not switching
course, and they let their minds default to what is given or what has already been
decided. They rely on stay-the-course impulses all the time, often with deceptively
satisfactory results [31, 32]. This was likely what happened on June 30, 2013, and other
fatal WF, and cogently describes the bad decisions with good outcomes process.
6 Conclusion
The paper provided general information for in-depth discussions, education, and
training. The authors and most WFF supervisors believe that WFF must do the fol-
lowing to practice responsible leadership and safe WFF practices:
1. Commit to memory, understanding, and following the Ten Standard Fire Fighting
Orders as well as the 18 Watch Out Situations;
2. Memorize, understand, and follow the directives in the Downhill Checklist;
3. Memorize, know, and mitigate the Common Denominators of Tragedy Fires,
including Human Factors.
As difﬁcult as it may be, all WFF must move beyond blaming fatalities on an
offender(s), and instead we must seek to understand the systemic causes triggering the
outcomes, as concluded by Reason (1997) [33]. To reduce the frequency of WFF
fatalities, a complete understanding of the human failures that led to these outcomes,
including the human failures role, is critical. Continued identiﬁcation of WFF Decision
Errors and complete comprehension of the dynamics involved in both positive and
negative outcomes are necessary. Furthermore, to truly improve WFF safety and
performance, we must continue to know and strictly follow the basic WFF Rules
discussed above and apply the following proposals regarding improved future training,
existing procedural checklists, and overall support systems. Paraphrasing heavily from
the municipal Fresno F.D. (2015) Cortland Incident Findings and Recommendations,
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some suggestions generated from that persuasive investigation and this current article
include:
1. Ensure effective operational Leadership, Human Factors, and Group Dynamics
training for all WFF and Supervisors;
2. Effectively evaluate and cultivate competent, experienced, worthy WFF leaders
[34];
3. Reconsider and substitute the flawed practice of simply accepting the WFF injury
and death causes as just being part of the job, or the cost of doing business [34];
4. Disapprove of freelancing and independent action, i.e., when individuals or groups
work independently and commit to tasks without the expressed knowledge and/or
consent of their supervisor [34];
5. Effect positive change to avoid future WFF fatalities by requiring all WFF at all
levels to memorize, recognize, apply, and mitigate the WFF Rules on every WF
assignment, e.g. 10 Standard Fireﬁghting Orders, 18 Watch Out Situations, LCES,
Common Denominators of Fatality Fires, and the Downhill Line Construction
Checklist [8], and
6. To effectively change a culture, this transition will succeed only when followed by,
supported by, and mandated with a “top down” mentality [34], i.e., managers,
supervisors, and ﬁreﬁghters working collaboratively, “talking the talk and walking
the walk.”
While leaders at all levels of the organization must make their expectations clear,
trust and accountability by all those within the chain of command will be critical to any
overall success. The desired change must be clearly communicated, and those in
positions of authority at all levels must be held accountable to set a good example, in
addition to leading, supporting, enforcing, and creating these expectations [34].
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